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289 
LANDLORDS BEWARE, YOU MAY BE RENTING 
YOUR OWN ROOM . . . IN JAIL: LANDLORDS 
SHOULD NOT BE PROSECUTED FOR 
HARBORING ALIENS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress’s failures to pass immigration reform in 20061 and 20072 
frustrated many Americans, causing municipalities across the country to 
take “illegal immigration” into their own hands. In recent years, over two 
hundred municipalities have considered or approved anti-immigrant 
ordinances,3 and many of the approved ordinances are in litigation.4 These 
ordinances often prohibit landlords from renting to undocumented 
immigrants.5 They raise the issue of whether the federal government 
should enforce the prohibition of harboring undocumented immigrants 
against landlords, subjecting them to the possibilities of felony 
convictions, federal prison sentences, and heavy fines.6 
 
 
 1. Charles Babington, New Congress Unlikely to Rush Toughest Issues, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 
2006, at A03; see Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 
4437, 109th Cong. (2005); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. 
(2006). 
 2. Jonathan Weisman, Immigration Bill Dies in Senate; Bipartisan Compromise Fails To Satisfy 
the Right or the Left, WASH. POST, June 29, 2007, at A1; see S. 1639, A Bill to Provide for 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform and for Other Purposes, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 3. See Fair Immigration Reform Movement, Database of Recent Local Ordinances on 
Immigration, July 23, 2007, http://www.fairimmigration.org/learn/immigration-reform-and-
immigrants/local-level/ (click on “Database”). But see Ken Belson & Jill Capuzzo, Towns Rethink 
Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A1, A23 (“In June, a federal judge 
issued a preliminary injunction against a housing ordinance in Farmers Branch, Tex., that would have 
imposed fines against landlords who rented to illegal immigrants. . . . [A] federal judge struck down 
ordinances in Hazleton, Pa., the first town to enact laws barring illegal immigrants from working or 
renting homes there.”); Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Applauds Repeal of Anti-Immigrant Ordinance 
in Riverside, NJ (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://aclu.org/immigrants/31856prs20070917.html. 
 4. The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu (follow “Search” 
hyperlink; select “Immigration” on the “case type” drop-down menu; then follow “Conduct Search” 
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 20, 2008). 
 5. This Note uses the term “undocumented immigrant,” instead of “illegal alien,” to refer to a 
person lacking valid immigration status present in the United States. The Immigration and Nationality 
Act defines “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(3) (2006). However, the term “illegal alien” is ambiguous and imprecise, as well as 
xenophobic and dehumanizing. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 1193 (Thomson West 2005); Kevin R. Johnson, A “Hard Look” at the Executive Branch’s 
Asylum Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 279, 281 n.5. See also Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No 
Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Local Government Cooperation with the INS, 7 LA 
RAZA L.J. 50, 51 n.7 (1994). 
 6. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
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During fiscal year 2006, 1,596 individuals were convicted of “human 
smuggling and trafficking,” which includes “bring[ing], transport[ing], 
harbor[ing], or smuggl[ing] illegal aliens into or within the United 
States.”7 These convictions constituted approximately one-tenth of all 
immigration-related criminal convictions and resulted in $11 million 
worth of seized property.8 These numbers would increase dramatically if 
the federal government prosecuted landlords for harboring. 
Although America’s current wave of anti-immigrant sentiment raises 
the specter of a federal crackdown on landlords, this Note asserts that the 
Supreme Court should narrowly interpret the definition of “harboring” to 
prevent normal landlords from being prosecuted for renting to 
undocumented immigrants. Part II of this Note explores the harboring 
statute’s scope, sentencing, legislative history, related provisions, and past 
applications. Part III examines the circuit split regarding the definition of 
“harboring.” Part IV analyzes problems that would arise if landlords were 
prosecuted for harboring, drawing on landlord-tenant liability, 
employment law, and housing discrimination.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Federal law prohibits individuals from “harboring” aliens. This Part 
explains the statute’s text, legislative history, penalty provisions, and 
companion crimes. It also discusses past prosecutions for harboring in the 
context of the human trafficking and the Sanctuary Movement. 
A. Harboring Prohibition 
The federal anti-harboring statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324, states: 
Any person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact 
that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in 
violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or 
attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in 
any place, including any building or any means of transportation . . . 
shall be punished.9  
 
 
 7. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2006, http://www.dhs.gov/ 
ximgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk06En.shtm (follow “Table 37” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 20, 
2008). 
 8. Id. 
 9. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1324(a)(3)(B) (“An 
alien described in this subparagraph is an alien who . . . is an unauthorized alien (as defined in section 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss2/5
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The statute mandates that proceeds and properties resulting from harboring 
shall be seized and are subject to forfeiture.10 It also sets forth the 
materials evidencing the alien’s lack of valid immigration status.11 
Congress has determined that employment does not constitute 
harboring;12 however, in the prohibition’s long history, Congress has never 
defined “conceal,” “harbor,” or “shield from detection.”13 
B. Legislative History 
Before 1917, bringing aliens into the United States was a crime, but 
harboring them once they arrived was not.14 With the Immigration Act of 
February 3, 1917, Congress made harboring “any alien not duly admitted” 
a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine of $2,000 and a prison 
sentence of five years.15 This statute did not include a mens rea 
requirement.  
The 1917 act was repealed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952.16 Though the maximum fine and prison sentence remained the same, 
this act harshened the former anti-harboring statute by making violation a 
felony and narrowed it by requiring the mens rea of “willfully or 
knowingly.”17 
 
 
1324(a)(h)(3) of this title), and . . . has been brought into the United States in violation of this 
subsection.”). 
 10. Id. § 1324b(1). 
 11. Id. § 1324b(3) (including judicial or administrative proceeding records, executive branch 
records, and immigration officer testimony). 
 12. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Title II, ch. 8, § 274(a), 66 Stat. 229 (“[F]or 
the purposes of this section, employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to 
employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring.”). See also infra notes 66–78 and 
accompanying text. 
 13. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
 14. William G. Phelps, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Application of § 274(a)(1)(A)(iii) 
of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)), Making it Unlawful to Harbor or 
Conceal Illegal Alien, 137 A.L.R. FED. 255 § 2 (1997). 
 15. Act of Feb. 3, 1917, ch. 29 § 8, 39 Stat. 874, 880 (“[A]ny person . . . who shall conceal or 
harbor, or attempt to conceal or harbor, or assist or abet another to conceal or harbor in any place, 
including any building, vessel, railway car, conveyance, or vehicle, any alien not duly admitted by an 
immigrant inspector or not lawfully entitled to enter or to reside within the United States under the 
terms of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 16. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Title IV, § 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 279. 
 17. Id. § 274(a), 66 Stat. 228-29 (“Any person . . . who . . . willfully or knowingly conceals, 
harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, in any 
place, including any building or any means of transportation . . . any alien . . . not duly admitted by an 
immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States . . . shall be 
guilty of a felony . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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In 1981, Congress added forfeiture provisions to the anti-harboring 
statute,18 permitting the government to seize without a warrant any 
property either owned by a consenting party or any party privy to a 
violation of § 1324(a), given probable cause, “where a warrant is not 
constitutionally required.”19  
With the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 
Congress rewrote the anti-harboring provisions.20 The mens rea 
requirement, formerly “willfully or knowingly,” became “knowing or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains 
in the United States in violation of law.” Congress also increased the 
maximum prison sentence to five years.21  
In 1994,22 1996,23 and 2004,24 Congress modified and increased 
maximum sentences for harboring.25 Despite this extensive legislative 
history, Congress has never defined “harboring.” 
 
 
 18. Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. 97-116, § 12, 95 Stat. 1617. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Immigration Reform and Control Act § 112(a), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2005)) (“Any person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an 
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or 
shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any 
place, including any building or any means of transportation . . . [shall be fined and/or imprisoned].”) 
(emphasis added). 
 21. Id. It also moved the fine provisions to United States Code, Title 18. Id. 
 22. Act of Sept. 13, 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, Title VI, § 60024, 108 Stat. 1981–82 (“Section 
274(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)) is amended—(1) in paragraph (1) 
. . . (G) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ‘(B) A person who violates 
subparagraph (A) shall, for each alien in respect to whom such a violation occurs—(i) in the case of a 
violation of subparagraph (A)(i), be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than 
10 years, or both; (ii) in the case of a violation of subparagraph (A) (ii), (iii), or (iv), be fined under 
title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both . . . .’”). 
 23. Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C, Title II, §§ 203(a)–(d), 110 Stat. 3009-565 
(“Section 274(a)(1)(B)(i) (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(B)(i)) is amended by inserting ‘or in the case of a 
violation of subparagraph (A)(ii), (iii), or (iv) in which the offense was done for the purpose of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain’ after ‘subparagraph (A)(i).’”). 
 24. Act of Dec. 17, 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, Title V, § 5401, 118 Stat. 3737 (“Section 274(a) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following: ‘(4) In the case of a person who has brought aliens into the United States in violation of this 
subsection, the sentence otherwise provided for may be increased by up to 10 years if—(A) the offense 
was part of an ongoing commercial organization or enterprise; (B) aliens were transported in groups of 
10 or more; and (C)(i) aliens were transported in a manner that endangered their lives; or (ii) the aliens 
presented a life-threatening health risk to people in the United States.’”). 
 25. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
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C. Penalty Provisions 
Currently, the anti-harboring statute punishes harboring with a fine, 
imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.26 The maximum 
sentence for harboring “done for the purpose of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain” is ten years imprisonment and/or a fine under Title 
18.27 If the landlord is “part of an ongoing commercial organization or 
enterprise,” the judge can increase the sentence by another ten years.28 The 
United States Sentencing Guidelines’ lowest recommended29 sentence for 
a person with no criminal history who has harbored a single individual for 
profit is ten years.30 Thus, a landlord convicted of harboring could face 
severe consequences, including a twenty-year sentence in federal prison. 
D. Companion Crimes 
Congress’s attempts to deter unpermitted immigration are broader than 
the harboring prohibition. Section 1324 reveals Congress’s perception of 
this problem as a process: individuals induce aliens to come to the United 
States without permission, and the aliens enter, travel, and reside in the 
country.31 The harboring statute’s companion crimes are: (1) encouraging 
or inducing an alien to “come to, enter, or reside in the United States, 
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or 
residence is or will be in violation of law;”32 (2) bringing an alien into the 
United States “at a place other than a designated port of entry or place 
other than as designated by the Commissioner”;33 and (3) transporting an 
undocumented immigrant within the United States.34 Although Congress 
has never defined “harboring,” this statutory framework suggests it 
intended the anti-harboring statute to prevent entry without permission by 
deterring the final step in this process.  
 
 
 26. Id. § 1324a(1)(B)(ii). 
 27. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 28. Id. § 1324 (a)(4)(A). 
 29. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). 
 30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1(b)(1) (2006), available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/2006guid/gl2006.pdf; id. at 381 (Sentencing Table). 
 31. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A). 
 32. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
 33. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 34. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
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E. Past Harboring Prosecutions 
The federal anti-harboring statute has been used to prosecute 
individuals who intentionally subvert border control, as demonstrated by 
human trafficking prosecutions and the Sanctuary Movement. 
1. Human Trafficking 
Some human trafficking prosecutions involve allegations of harboring. 
For example, in United States v. Valle-Maldonado,35 four defendants were 
indicted on twenty-eight counts, including harboring. “The defendants had 
arranged for women, including two minors, to be smuggled into the United 
States from Mexico to engage in commercial sexual activity. The 
defendants suppressed attempts to escape by threatening to harm the 
victim’s relatives in Mexico.”36 However, trafficking prosecutions that 
include counts of harboring are not brought often.37 They should occur 
more, because the traffickers know the individuals are undocumented, 
intend to hide them from immigration authorities, and trafficking is 
dangerous.  
2. Sanctuary Movement 
In the 1980s, the federal government prosecuted individuals who 
provided sanctuary to Central American asylum-seekers on the basis of 
harboring.38 In United States v. Aguilar, eight defendants were “convicted 
of masterminding and running a modern-day underground railroad that 
 
 
 35. No. 2:04-CR-00387 (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 11, 2004). 
 36. Sara Elizabeth Dill, Old Crimes in New Times: Human Trafficking and the Modern Justice 
System, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2006, at 15. 
 37. See Becki Young, Trafficking of Humans Across United States Borders: How United States 
Laws Can be Used to Punish Traffickers and Protect Victims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 73, 90 (1998) 
(“Whereas the term trafficking by definition involves some degree of coercion or force, the term 
smuggling is frequently applied to cases in which the alien actively seeks the assistance of a smuggler 
to assist him in entering the United States. Although the alien in the former case may properly be 
classified as a ‘victim,’ the alien in the latter case may not. The perception that the ‘bringing and 
harboring’ provisions are intended to apply to ‘victimless’ cases of smuggling might lead to their less 
than vigorous enforcement, even in cases of trafficking in which the aliens truly may be classified as 
victims. However, nothing in the language of the statute precludes its application in cases of 
trafficking, so long as the INS makes a conscious choice to use the bringing and harboring provisions 
in prosecuting traffickers, this obstacle should not be significant.”); see generally Katrin Corrigan, 
Note, Putting the Brakes on the Global Trafficking of Women for the Sex Trade: An Analysis of 
Existing Regulatory Schemes to Stop the Flow of Traffic, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 151 (2001). 
 38. See generally Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Babino, Harboring, Sanctuary and the Crime of 
Charity Under Federal Immigration Law, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (1993); Michele Altemus, 
The Sanctuary Movement, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 683 (1988) (describing major prosecutions). 
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smuggled Central American natives across the Mexican border with 
Arizona.”39 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the two harboring 
convictions because the defendants “intended to help the aliens in question 
to evade INS detection.”40  
In American Baptist Churches in the United States of America v. 
Meese,41 churches and refugee organizations sued the government to 
challenge their members’ sanctuary harboring convictions. They lost on a 
motion for summary judgment.42 The sanctuary workers clearly showed 
their intent to hide the asylum-seekers from immigration enforcement. 
Human trafficking and the Sanctuary Movement are clear contexts for 
harboring prosecutions because the perpetrators know the aliens are 
undocumented and intend to shield them from law enforcement. However, 
Congress has never defined “harboring” despite the statute’s long 
legislative history and severe criminal penalties. Through more murky fact 
patterns, some courts of appeals have emerged with different definitions of 
“harboring.” 
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING THE DEFINITION OF HARBORING 
Courts have struggled to define “harboring” for the last eighty years, 
and, as a result, the circuits are split. The Sixth43 and Second44 Circuits’ 
narrow definitions of harboring require a defendant to know that the alien 
is undocumented and to hide the alien from law enforcement in order to be 
convicted. The Fifth45 and Ninth46 Circuits’ definitions are broader, thus 
making conviction easier. In the Fifth Circuit, evading law enforcement is 
not required, whereas in the Ninth Circuit, knowledge of the alien’s 
undocumented status is unnecessary. These cases are factually distinct 
from a landlord whose tenant is an undocumented immigrant, and are 
therefore mere dicta. However, the broad definitions of the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits suggest such landlords could be at risk of being prosecuted and 
convicted of harboring. 
 
 
 39. 883 F.2d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 40. Id. at 690. 
 41. 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
 42. The plaintiffs grounded their arguments in the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
selective enforcement, international law, equal protection and tort claims. Id. at 758–59. 
 43. Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1928). 
 44. United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 574 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 45. United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173, 1180 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 
(1978); United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067, 1072 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 46. United States v. Acosta de Evans, 531 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
836 (1976). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:289 
 
 
 
 
A. Sixth Circuit: Narrow Definition of Harboring 
In 1928, the Sixth Circuit became the first court of appeals to define 
harboring. In Susnjar v. United States,47 the defendants transported 
undocumented aliens from Canada to Detroit and agreed to house them in 
Cleveland.48 They were convicted of conspiring to violate the Immigration 
Act of 1917 for “concealing and harboring and attempting to conceal and 
harbor” the aliens.49 The Sixth Circuit upheld their convictions because 
they harbored the aliens by “clandestinely shelter[ing], succor[ing], and 
protect[ing]” them and concealed them by “shielding [them] from 
observation” and preventing their discovery.50  
Despite the circuit split that emerged after Susnjar,51 the Eastern 
District of Kentucky upheld this definition in 2006.52 The district court 
focused on Susnjar’s use of the term “clandestinely,” defined as “done 
secretly or in hiding,” to hold that “harboring” includes a scienter 
element.53 The court reasoned that “clandestinely” implies that harboring 
includes the “intent to assist the alien’s attempt to evade or avoid detection 
by law enforcement.”54 
These cases are mere dicta as applied to a landlord and tenant whose 
relationship is limited to housing. However, they do suggest that a 
landlord who knows that her tenant is an undocumented alien cannot be 
convicted of harboring unless she houses her tenant in an effort to hide 
him from law enforcement. 
B. Second Circuit: The Development of Another Narrow Definition of 
Harboring 
The Second Circuit first addressed the definition of harboring in 
1940,55 but its definition has changed many times. In United States v. 
 
 
 47. 27 F.2d 223. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 224. 
 51. See infra Parts IV.B–D. 
 52. United States v. Belevin-Ramales, 458 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D. Ky. 2006). 
 53. Id. at 411 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 262 (1982)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. United States v. Smith, 112 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1940). Smith was charged with conspiring to 
violate 8 U.S.C. § 144 (1925), a precursor of the current harboring provision (“Any person . . . who . . . 
shall conceal or harbor, or attempt to conceal or harbor, or assist or abet another to conceal or harbor in 
any place, including any building, vessel, railway car, conveyance, or vehicle, any alien not duly 
admitted by an immigrant inspector or not lawfully entitled to enter or to reside within the United 
States under the terms of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”) and 18 U.S.C. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss2/5
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Smith, the defendant was convicted of harboring and prostituting 
undocumented immigrants.56 The Second Circuit held that harboring 
“means only that the [aliens] shall be sheltered from the immigration 
authorities and shielded from observation to prevent their discovery as 
aliens.”57 As in the Sixth Circuit, this definition requires the defendant to 
intend to help the undocumented immigrant evade the law in order to be 
convicted of harboring. 
Two weeks later,58 the Second Circuit handed down United States v. 
Mack, authored by Judge Learned Hand.59 Mack, a brothel manager, was 
convicted of conspiring to harbor a Canadian prostitute whom she 
employed.60 However, Mack did not know of the prostitute’s immigration 
status,61 so the court reversed the conviction. It held that “knowledge of 
the alienage is an element” of harboring.62 Judge Hand reasoned: 
It would be shocking to hold guilty anyone who gave shelter to an 
alien whom he supposed to be a citizen; and besides, the statute is 
very plainly directed against those who abet evaders of the law 
against unlawful entry, as the collocation of “conceal” and “harbor” 
shows. Indeed, the word, “harbor” alone often connotes 
surreptitious concealment.63 
Like Smith,64 Mack requires a defendant to perceive an individual as an 
undocumented immigrant and conceal her from law enforcement in order 
to be convicted of harboring. 
The Second Circuit broadened this definition in 1975 in United States 
v. Lopez, in which the defendant rented houses to undocumented 
immigrants and arranged jobs and sham marriages for some of them.65 The 
court held that harboring means “to give shelter or refuge”66 to an 
 
 
§ 402 (1946) (making it a misdemeanor for “[e]very person who shall keep, maintain, control, support, 
or harbor in any house or place for the purpose of prostitution . . . any alien woman or girl . . .” who 
fails to register with the Commissioner-General of Immigration or commits fraud in the registration). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 85. 
 58. Smith, 112 F.2d 83, was issued May 20, 1940, and United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290 (2d 
Cir. 1940), was issued June 3, 1940. 
 59. Mack, 112 F.2d at 291. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Smith, 112 F.2d 83. 
 65. United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975). 
 66. Id. at 441 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1031 (1961); BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 847 (4th ed. 1951)). 
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undocumented immigrant and the defendant need only have knowledge of 
the “alien’s unlawful status” to be convicted of harboring.67 Lopez 
broadened Mack’s definition of harboring, because the defendant’s intent 
to hide the undocumented immigrant from the immigration authorities was 
no longer necessary to sustain a harboring conviction. 
Lopez is the basis of the Fifth Circuit’s definition of harboring.68 Its 
holding is mere dictum when applied to a landlord who does not operate a 
haven, arrange illegal employment, or create sham marriages. However, if 
applied liberally, this definition of harboring implicates a landlord who 
rents to an individual whom she knows is an undocumented immigrant, 
regardless of whether the landlord intends to shelter the individual from 
immigration enforcement. 
In 1999, the Second Circuit returned to Mack’s narrow definition, 
holding that harboring “encompasses conduct tending substantially to 
facilitate an alien’s remaining in the United States illegally and to prevent 
government authorities from detecting his unlawful presence.”69 Based on 
this definition, a landlord whose relationship with his tenant is limited to 
housing could not be convicted of harboring in the Second Circuit. 
C. Fifth Circuit: A Broad Definition of Harboring 
The Fifth Circuit adopted and expanded Lopez, which held that a 
defendant must have knowledge of the immigrant’s undocumented status 
in order to be convicted of harboring,70 and that the anti-harboring statute 
“does not prohibit only smuggling-related activity.”71 The court reaffirmed 
this holding in 1982 in United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez.72 Since this 
interpretation of the statute lacks any connection to the smuggling process, 
it implicates a landlord who rents to an individual she knows to be an 
 
 
 67. Id. at 441; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 532 F.2d 834, 837 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 910 (2004); United States v. Herrera¸ 584 F.2d 1137, 1145 (2d Cir. 1978) (defining 
harboring as “conduct tending substantially to facilitate the alien’s ‘remaining in the United States 
illegally’”). 
 68. United States v. Balderas, 91 F. App’x. 354, 354 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 910 
(2004) (Harboring is “conduct which by its nature tends to substantially facilitate the alien’s remaining 
in the United States illegally.”). 
 69. United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 574 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (internal citation 
omitted). Conduct that substantially facilitates an alien’s remaining in the United States could include 
an act as simple as giving food to an undocumented alien child. 
 70. 521 F.2d 437. 
 71. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173. 
 72. 674 F.2d at 1073. See also Balderas, 91 F. App’x. at 354. 
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undocumented immigrant, even if the landlord is not trying to help the 
immigrant evade immigration authorities.73 
D. Ninth Circuit: An Independently Broad Definition of Harboring 
The Ninth Circuit defined harboring independently of Lopez,74 but its 
definition is broader. In United States v. Acosta de Evans the court held 
that the purpose of the anti-harboring statute is to “keep unauthorized 
aliens from entering or remaining in the country.”75 To effectuate this 
purpose, the court defined harboring as affording shelter and held that 
“harboring need not be part of the chain of transactions in smuggling.”76 
Acosta de Evans omits any discussion of mens rea, implying that a 
landlord with no knowledge that his tenant is an undocumented immigrant 
could be convicted of harboring. 
Appellate cases defining harboring are dicta as applied to landlords 
whose sole relationship with their tenants is providing housing. If these 
cases were liberally applied to landlords, the circuit split regarding the 
definition of harboring would be of great importance. For instance, it 
would be difficult to prosecute landlords in the Sixth and Second Circuits, 
where, in order to be convicted of harboring, a landlord must know that his 
tenant is an undocumented immigrant and intend to hide him from law 
enforcement. However, in the Fifth Circuit, a landlord could be convicted 
of harboring even if the shelter he provides is unrelated to the smuggling 
process and does not attempt to evade authority. Landlords are most 
exposed to prosecution in the Ninth Circuit, where a landlord could be 
convicted even if he does not know that his tenant is an undocumented 
immigrant. Other areas of law, including the landlord-tenant relationship, 
employment law, and housing discrimination, support the Second and 
Sixth Circuits’ narrow definitions of “harboring.” 
IV. HARBORING’S LIMITS 
The anti-harboring statute is not the proper vehicle with which to 
regulate immigration in the context of landlord-tenant relationships. First, 
 
 
 73. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d at 1074 n.5 (“We need not determine in this case whether one can 
conceive of willful or knowing conduct tending to substantially facilitate an aliens’ remaining in the 
United States illegally that nevertheless might not be within a fair reading of the words knowingly or 
willfully harboring, concealing or shielding from detection an illegal alien or attempting to do so.”). 
 74. 521 F.2d 437. 
 75. 531 F.2d at 430.  
 76. Id. n.4. 
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prosecuting a normal landlord for harboring would be flawed, because the 
landlord would receive a significantly greater penalty than his 
undocumented immigrant tenant. Second, harboring prosecutions would 
place landlords in the untenable position of being required to ascertain 
tenants’ immigration status. Third, a landlord who evicts a tenant or denies 
an applicant could be sued for national origin discrimination in violation 
of the Fair Housing Act.77 
A. Comparison of Landlord and Tenant Liability 
Convicting a landlord under the federal anti-harboring statute for 
renting to an undocumented immigrant is contrary to the normal balance 
of tenant and landlord criminal liability. A landlord can be implicated by a 
tenant who commits a crime on the rental property. For example, if a 
landlord discovers that her tenant sells drugs or is involved in other illegal 
activity on the premises and she fails to evict him, she risks being sued and 
having the property forfeited.78 Additionally, a landlord cannot provide for 
the commission of unlawful acts in a lease.79 If a landlord leases property 
to a tenant with the knowledge that the tenant will commit a crime, the 
lease becomes void,80 and the landlord shares equal criminal liability with 
the tenant.81 
Being undocumented is not a crime. The tenant’s lack of valid 
immigration status could cause him to be removed from the United States, 
but the Supreme Court has held that “[d]eportation, however severe its 
consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a 
criminal procedure.”82 If harboring were interpreted broadly to implicate 
landlords who rent to undocumented immigrants, such a landlord would 
face criminal penalties, whereas the tenant would only face civil penalties. 
There is only one other situation in which a person can be criminally 
sanctioned for another’s civil legal matters: immigration in the context of 
employment, but Congress passed a law expressly authorizing this 
dichotomy. Therefore, harboring should be narrowly interpreted. 
 
 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000). 
 78. 83 AM. JUR. TRIALS 385 § 36; see also id. § 41. 
 79. Zankman v. Tireno Towers, 297 A.2d 23, 24 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1972). 
 80. See McMahon v. Anderson, 728 A.2d 656, 659 (D.C. 1999); Cent. States Health & Life Co. 
of Omaha v. Miracle Hills Ltd. P’ship, 456 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Neb. 1990). 
 81. 83 AM. JUR. TRIALS 385 § 36. 
 82. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952). Deportation is now termed “removal.” 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2006). Aliens are neither entitled to 
due process nor to the Constitutional prohibition on application of ex post facto laws. Harisiades, 342 
U.S. at 596. 
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B. Civilian Determination of Immigration Status 
Immigration is an incredibly complex area of law, based on federal 
statutes, treaties, federal cases, executive orders, and administrative law.83 
The federal government extensively regulates the only situation in which it 
requires a private citizen to ascertain the immigration status of another, 
which is the employer-employee relationship under IRCA.84 
IRCA prohibits employers from hiring “unauthorized aliens.”85 It also 
prohibits employers who are aware of their employees’ unauthorized 
status from continuing to employ them.86 Employers can raise the 
affirmative defense that they complied in good faith with IRCA’s 
employment verification system87 by correcting any errors after law 
enforcement notifies employers of them.88  
Congress has never required tenants to identify themselves or 
demonstrate proof of occupancy eligibility, but IRCA requires employees 
to identify themselves and demonstrate proof of work eligibility. An 
employer must attest that she has viewed documentation establishing the 
employees’ identity and work authorization,89 and she is required to retain 
evidence of the documents.90  
 
 
 83. See Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he labyrinthine character of modern 
immigration law” is “a maze of hyper-technical statutes and regulations.”). 
 84. Supra note 20, § 101(a)(1) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 85. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2006) (“It is unlawful for a person or other entity—(A) to hire, or to 
recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an 
unauthorized alien (as defined in subsection (h)(3) of this section) with respect to such employment, or 
(B) (i) to hire for employment in the United States an individual without complying with the 
requirements of subsection (b) of this section or (ii) if the person or entity is an agricultural 
association, agricultural employer, or farm labor contractor (as defined in section 1802 of Title 29), to 
hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an individual without 
complying with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section.”). 
 86. Id. § 1324a(a)(2) (“It is unlawful for a person or other entity, after hiring an alien for 
employment in accordance with paragraph (1), to continue to employ the alien in the United States 
knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien with respect to such employment.”). 
 87. Id. § 1324a(a)(3) (“A person or entity that establishes that it has complied in good faith with 
the requirements of subsection (b) of this section with respect to the hiring, recruiting, or referral for 
employment of an alien in the United States has established an affirmative defense that the person or 
entity has not violated paragraph (1)(A) with respect to such hiring, recruiting, or referral.”). 
 88. Id. § 1324a(b)(6) (“[A] person or entity is considered to have complied with a requirement of 
this subsection notwithstanding a technical or procedural failure to meet such requirement if there was 
a good faith attempt to comply with the requirement.”). 
 89. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(A). The potential employee can either show a single document establishing 
both his employee’s work authorization and identity, or two documents, one evidencing his work 
authorization and one establishing his identity. Documents establishing employment authorization and 
identity include a United States passport and a resident alien card. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(B). An example of 
a document establishing employment authorization is a social security card. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(C). An 
example of a document establishing identity is a state-issued driver’s license. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(D).  
 90. Id. § 1324a(b)(2). 
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Employers charged with violating IRCA are entitled to a hearing with 
an administrative law judge (ALJ).91 If the ALJ finds a violation by a 
preponderance of the evidence,92 the employer must cease and desist and 
pay a fine.93 The employer can be criminally punished for a maximum of 
six months, but only if she “engage[d] in a pattern or practice” of 
violations.94 The parties can appeal to the Attorney General95 and the 
employer can appeal to a circuit court of appeals.96 
IRCA includes two major protections for employees.97 First, employers 
cannot discriminate against employees on the basis of national origin or 
citizenship.98 Second, an employer cannot harass an employee for 
 
 
 91. Id. § 1324a(e)(3)(B). ALJs are under the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer 
of the Department of Justice. Department of Justice, Organization, Mission and Functions Manual, 
February 2006: Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/ 
manual/eoir.htm (The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer “is headed by a Chief 
Administrative Hearing Officer, who is responsible for the general supervision and management of the 
administrative law judges who preside at hearings mandated by IRCA and the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). Administrative law judges hear cases and adjudicate issues arising 
under the provisions of the INA relating to (1) unlawful hiring, recruiting, referring for a fee, and 
continued employment of unauthorized aliens, and failure to comply with employment verification 
requirements, (2) immigration-related document fraud, and (3) immigration-related unfair employment 
practices. Complaints are brought by DHS immigration officials, with the exception of those involving 
immigration-related unfair employment practices, which are brought by the Office of Special Counsel 
or private litigants as prescribed by statute.”). 
 92. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(3)(C) (2006). 
 93. Id. § 1324a(e)(4) (“With respect to a violation of subsection (a)(1)(A) or (a)(2) of this 
section, the order under this subsection—(A) shall require the person or entity to cease and desist from 
such violations and to pay a civil penalty in an amount of—(i) not less than $250 and not more than 
$2,000 for each unauthorized alien with respect to whom a violation of either such subsection 
occurred. (ii) not less than $2,000 and not more than $5,000 for each such alien in the case of a person 
or entity previously subject to one order under this paragraph, or (iii) not less than $3,000 and not 
more than $10,000 for each such alien in the case of a person or entity previously subject to more than 
one order under this paragraph; and (B) may require the person or entity—(i) to comply with the 
requirements of subsection (b) of this section (or subsection (d) of this section if applicable) with 
respect to individuals hired (or recruited or referred for employment for a fee) during a period of up to 
three years, and (ii) to take such other remedial action as is appropriate.”). 
 94. Id. § 1324a(f)(1) (“Any person or entity which engages in a pattern or practice of violations 
of subsection (a)(1)(A) or (a)(2) of this section shall be fined not more than $3,000 for each 
unauthorized alien with respect to whom such a violation occurs, imprisoned for not more than six 
months for the entire pattern or practice, or both, notwithstanding the provisions of any other Federal 
law relating to fine levels.”). 
 95. The parties can appeal the ALJ’s decision to the Attorney General within thirty days. Id. 
§ 1324a(e)(7). 
 96. If the Attorney General finds against the employer, the employer has forty-five days to 
petition a court of appeals for review. Id. § 1324a(e)(8). 
 97. See generally Donald R. Stacy, The Standard for Proving an Unfair Immigration-Related 
Employment Practice Under IRCA: Disparate Impact or Intent?, 4 LAB. LAW. 271 (1988); Linda Sue 
Johnson, Comment, The Antidiscrimination Provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 62 
TUL. L. REV. 1059 (1988). 
 98. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (2006) (“It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice for 
a person or other entity to discriminate against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien, as 
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immigration documents after the employee presents apparently valid 
documents from an approved list.99 An employee can file a complaint 
against her employer with the Special Counsel for Immigration-Related 
Unfair Employment Practices, who can then choose to file a complaint 
with an ALJ.100 Upon finding a violation by a preponderance of the 
evidence, an ALJ can issue a cease and desist order,101 grant limited back-
pay to the employee,102 and fine the employer.103 
Congress articulated a sophisticated balance of prohibitions and 
safeguards for employers and employees in relation to employees’ 
immigration status. However, Congress has never done so for landlords 
and tenants with respect to tenants’ immigration status.  
Adopting a broad definition of harboring that could implicate normal 
landlords for renting to undocumented immigrants would be inconsistent 
with Congress’s concern for authorized immigrants as reflected in IRCA. 
First, unlike employers, who are protected under IRCA if they show a 
good faith effort to ascertain documents’ validity, even if the documents 
are actually invalid,104 landlords have no protection for incorrectly 
accepting them. Second, concerned landlords would probably evict many 
aliens present lawfully because they are unfamiliar with the range of valid 
documents. This would be inconsistent with Congress’s concern for 
authorized immigrants as reflected in IRCA, because it would mean that 
they would no longer be able to live in the United States, much less work 
in the United States. Therefore, the courts should adopt a narrow definition 
of harboring so that normal landlords are not prosecuted. 
 
 
defined in section 1324a(h)(3) of this title) with respect to the hiring, or recruitment or referral for a 
fee, of the individual for employment or the discharging of the individual from employment—(A) 
because of such individual’s national origin, or (B) in the case of a protected individual (as defined in 
paragraph (3)), because of such individual’s citizenship status.”). There are only limited exceptions. Id. 
§ 1324b(a)(2). 
 99. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)(ii) (“If an individual provides a document or combination of documents 
that reasonably appears on its face to be genuine and that is sufficient to meet the requirements of the 
first sentence of this paragraph, nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as requiring the person or 
entity to solicit the production of any other document or as requiring the individual to produce such 
another document.”). 
 100. Id. §§ 1324b(b-c). 
 101. Id. § 1324b(g)(2)(A) (“If, upon the preponderance of the evidence, an administrative law 
judge determines that any person or entity named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in 
any such unfair immigration-related employment practice, then the judge shall state his findings of fact 
and shall issue and cause to be served on such person or entity an order which requires such person or 
entity to cease and desist from such unfair immigration-related employment practice.”). 
 102. Id. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iii). 
 103. Id. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv). 
 104. Id. § 1324a(b)(6). 
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C. National Origin Discrimination 
Adopting a broad definition of harboring would increase the likelihood 
that normal landlords would be prosecuted for renting to undocumented 
immigrants, which would increase housing discrimination on the basis of 
national origin. The Fair Housing Act (FHA)105 broadly106 declares: 
[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making 
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, 
or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national 
origin.107  
The FHA also makes discrimination “against any person in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision 
of services or facilities in connection therewith” unlawful in that it is 
based on the same protected classes.108 
If courts adopted broad definitions of harboring and landlords began to 
fear prosecution, the landlords would probably also grow to fear FHA 
national origin discrimination lawsuits. Under § 1324, landlords cannot 
provide shelter to unauthorized immigrants with knowledge or reckless 
disregard for their immigration status.109 The FHA simultaneously 
prohibits landlords from refusing to rent to potential tenants or 
discriminating in the terms of leases based on the tenants’ national origin.  
The FHA has been interpreted to prevent landlords from even seeking 
information about prospective tenants’ national origin. In Housing Rights 
Center v. Donald Sterling Corporation, the district court granted a 
preliminary injunction, because the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the 
merits that “asking a tenant to state his or her national origin as part of an 
application for apartment-related services violates the Fair Housing 
Act.”110 The court rejected any rational basis for the questions and 
determined that the defendants’ national security justification was a 
sham.111 
It would be very difficult for landlords to navigate between lawfully 
determining an individual’s immigration status and discriminating based 
 
 
 105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006). 
 106. See United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1528 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). 
 108. Id. § 3604(b). 
 109. 8 U.S.C § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
 110. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 111. Id. at 1142. 
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on national origin status. If the landlord denies a lawfully present applicant 
and the applicant suspects that the decision was based on alienage or 
national origin discrimination, the applicant can sue the landlord under the 
FHA.112 Whether or not landlords are required to pay damages, litigation is 
very expensive. Immigration law is extremely complex, making it likely 
that landlords will discriminate against tenants based on perceived 
stereotypes about “illegal aliens.” Therefore, adopting a narrow definition 
of harboring is consistent with housing discrimination law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should construe harboring narrowly, resolving the 
split in favor of the Sixth and Second Circuits. The definition should not 
just include housing an undocumented alien, but should also include the 
intent to hide the immigrant. Courts should also strictly adhere to the 
statutory mens rea of “knowing or in reckless disregard” of immigration 
status.113 This narrow interpretation of “harboring” will protect normal 
landlords who rent to documented immigrants. 
A broad interpretation of “harboring,” followed by landlord 
prosecutions, would pose many problems. Limited immigration 
enforcement resources would be better directed at dangerous cases of 
harboring, such as human trafficking. Whereas the landlords could receive 
twenty-year sentences and be ordered to pay large fines, undocumented 
immigrant tenants would only face a civil consequence—deportation. 
Landlords would refuse to rent to lawful immigrants after incorrectly 
determing that documents are insufficient or invalid. They would resort to 
stereotypes of “illegal aliens” to deny new tenants and anticipatorily evict 
old ones. FHA national origin discrimination lawsuits would increase, as 
would the size of our homeless population.  
Normal landlords should not be prosecuted for harboring 
undocumented immigrants, and the Supreme Court should define 
“harboring” narrowly to prevent this from occurring. 
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 112. Supra note 105. 
 113. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
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